What happened to the route
Search interest in "bab al-mandab strait maritime risks" rose by thousands of percent in the month to 22 August 2026, alongside queries about multinational security coalitions and drone attacks on shipping. Behind those searches is a routing decision that owners and operators have been making, voyage by voyage, since late 2023.
| Metric | Baseline (Oct 2023) | Late 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Suez container transits (monthly) | 583 | ~120 (Nov 2025) | −79% |
| Far East – Mediterranean transit | 34 days | 49 days | +15 days |
| Far East – North Europe transit | 40 days | 52 days | +12 days |
| Far East – Med schedule reliability | 45.3% | 28.8% | −16.5 pts |
| Far East – N Europe reliability | 48.8% | 27.5% | −21.3 pts |
| Far East – Med rate (per FEU) | USD 1,714 | USD 4,139 | +141.5% |
| Far East – N Europe rate (per FEU) | USD 1,066 | USD 2,586 | +142.6% |
UNCTAD separately recorded Suez transit levels in May 2025 running roughly 70% below 2023 averages.
`[VERIFY]` This situation is fluid. Re-check transit volumes, rates and security advisories immediately before publication.
The calculation owners run
Routing through Bab al-Mandab and Suez versus around the Cape of Good Hope is a multi-variable decision, and it is taken per voyage rather than as a policy.
| Factor | Suez route | Cape route |
|---|---|---|
| Distance and time | Shorter by 12–15 days on Far East–Europe | Longer |
| Fuel cost | Lower | Substantially higher |
| Canal dues | Payable | None |
| War risk premium | Additional premium; can be significant | None |
| Crew risk and consent | Material; may require agreement and bonus | None |
| Security measures | Hardening, possible embarked security | None |
| Insurance conditions | Notification required; conditions apply | Standard |
| Emissions and ETS cost | Lower fuel, lower allowance cost | Higher |
| CII impact | Better | Worse |
| Charterer instruction | May direct routing | May direct routing |
| Cargo owner risk appetite | Increasingly decisive | — |
Two things make this harder than a spreadsheet suggests. First, the crew dimension is not a cost line — collective agreements and employment terms may give seafarers rights regarding high-risk area transits, and informed consent is both an obligation and a practical necessity. Second, the risk is not linear: the difference between a route being dangerous and being catastrophic is not captured by a premium.
The crew and welfare dimension
Extended Cape routings have their own consequences for crews, which owners routing "the safe way" should not overlook:
- Longer voyages with fewer suitable crew change ports
- Contracts running to their limits; MLC caps maximum continuous service at 12 months
- Fewer opportunities for shore leave
- Different weather exposure and heavier hull fouling in warm water
- Provisions, medical support and spares logistics stretched
Under the 2025 MLC amendments — expected in force late December 2027 — key-worker recognition, shore leave provisions and non-discriminatory repatriation obligations tighten further.
Practical management measures
- Assess per voyage, using current advisories from naval coordination centres and industry sources, not a standing policy
- Register transits with the relevant reporting body — it costs nothing and puts naval assets in position
- Confirm war risk cover and notify underwriters before entry
- Obtain and document crew consent where required, and honour any applicable bonus provisions
- Brief and drill the crew on the specific threat before the transit
- Apply hardening measures proportionate to the assessment
- Plan crew changes around the extended rotation, at ports with real air connectivity
- Model the emissions and ETS cost of the routing choice, because it is now a material line
- Debrief after every transit and share across the fleet
The wider lesson
The Red Sea disruption is the clearest recent demonstration that maritime operations are a geopolitical business. Chokepoints — Suez, Hormuz, Malacca, Panama, the Turkish and Danish Straits — concentrate global trade into narrow, contestable spaces, and the effects of disruption propagate through capacity, rates, schedules, emissions and crew welfare within weeks.
Any owner's risk register should carry chokepoint disruption as a standing item, with a pre-thought alternative for each trade rather than an improvised response.
transit, reliability and rate data from Xeneta (December 2025); Suez transit trend also per UNCTAD RMT 2025. Situation is fluid — verify all figures and current security advisories before publication. Reviewed by the Zeaclub Editorial Team, 24 August 2026.
Frequently asked questions
Why did ships stop using the Suez Canal?
Attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab area from late 2023 led most operators to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope. Suez container transits fell from 583 in October 2023 to around 120 by November 2025.
How much longer is the Cape route?
On Far East–Europe trades, roughly 12 to 15 additional days depending on destination.
Who decides the route?
The master has ultimate authority for safety. Commercially, routing is decided between owner and charterer under the charterparty, informed by security advisories, insurance conditions and crew agreements.
What is war risk premium?
An additional insurance premium for entering designated high-risk areas, typically notified before entry and priced per transit or per period. Areas and rates can change at short notice.